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1 Refugees and Human Security
1.1 People on the run
Throughout history, there have always been
“people on the run.” Wars, political upheavals,
ethnic discrimination, religious strife, and other
human rights abuses have forced women, chil-
dren and men to flee their homes for a safer
place and cross international borders to seek
asylum in other countries. They do not know
what awaits them there but hope that they can
leave behind intimidation, physical assaults,
arbitrary detention, forced labor, abduction, tor-
ture, rape, mass killing and “ethnic cleansing.” 
According to the 1951 Refugee Convention, a
refugee is “any person who is outside their
country of origin and because of a well-founded
fear of persecution due to their race, religion,
nationality or political opinion, is unwilling or
unable to receive the protection of his or her
home country.” 1 At the end of 2009, there were
some 15 million refugees in the world. In Asia
alone, there were 3.4 million refugees. The top
four refugee hosting countries are: Pakistan with
1.7 million, Iran and Syria 1 million and Ger-
many 600,000 refugees. Poor developing coun-
tries bear heavy burdens in terms of refugee
protection. In Japan there were only 2332
refugees at the end of 2009. 2
As for the global situation sorrounding refugees,
since the end of the Cold War, there have been
notable increases in the number of refugees and
internally displaced persons (IDPs) as shown in
Chart 1. The number of refugees has been
decreasing but that of internally displaced per-
sons (IDPs) has been on the rise. There are sev-
eral causes for this trend. First, various ethnic,
religious, and political minorities revolted
against State authorities asserting their rights
and aspirations which have been oppressed dur-
ing the Cold War. These States in turn activated
their security and judicial systems to maintain
their political and social control via repression of
dissidents like in Northern Iraq. In such cases,
States were unwilling to protect their citizens.
Second, the nature of conflict has changed.
Internal civil conflicts broke out among armed
groups belonging to different ethnic or religious
groups, like those in the Balkans (Bosnia), the
Great Lakes (Rwanda, Sudan and DRC) West
Africa, the Caucasus and Afghanistan. In many
cases, States were unable to contain and end
such internal armed conflicts. Third, the strate-
gies of conflicts have also changed. Warring fac-
tions and armed groups often target unarmed
civilians and deliberately kill them, torture them,
maim them, and rape them, with the intention of
terrifying people so that the affected popula-
tions flee the disputed territories. These are
“push” factors that force people out of the coun-
try of origin.
On the other hand, since the mid-1980s, there
has been strong migratory pressure from the
developing countries in the South to the rich
industrialized countries in the North. As global-
ization continues and economic disparities
widen among countries, more and more people
move toward the industrialized countries in the
North to seek better economic opportunities.
Those developed countries have become con-
cerned about the influx of economic migrants,
Chart 1 
Refugees and IDPs assisted by UNHCR
not only because of the impact on labor market
but also because of the social tensions and
politicization of migration.  
The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States
added a new dimension: the securitization of
migration whereby migration is constructed to
be a threat to national security. Seriously con-
cerned about the possible negative conse-
quences of these migratory flows, industrialized
countries in the North, particularly EU member
states,  have introduced restrictive refugee and
migration policies, such as changes in national
legislation to restrict access to refugee status;
establish “non-arrival policies” to prevent people
without adequate documentation from entering
EU countries; implement “diversion policies” by
declaring countries bordering the EU to be “safe
third countries”; and adopt restrictive interpre-
tations of the 1951 Refugee Convention.3 As a
consequence, asylum space in the developed
countries has narrowed and the number of asy-
lum seekers there has been reduced from about
600,000 in 2000 to 300,000 in 2007. This does
not mean that there are fewer asylum seekers,
but instead it suggests that reaching the shores
of asylum countries is increasingly becoming dif-
ficult. At present, roughly 80% of asylum seek-
ers are rejected by northern countries and this
“rejection rate” is much higher than before.
These “push back” policies of the industrialized
countries contributed to the prolonged stay of
refugees in the developing countries, the declin-
ing number of refugees and the increase of IDPs
who cannot even leave their home countries, as
shown in Chart 1.
1.2 Human Security: freedom from fear and
freedom from want
The situations surrounding refugees can be
described as the absence of human security.
Human security is “to protect the vital core of all
human lives in ways that enhance human free-
doms and human fulfillment. [...] It means pro-
tecting people from critical (severe) and perva-
sive (widespread) threats and situations. [...] It
means creating political, social, environmental,
economic, military and cultural systems that
together give people the building blocks of sur-
vival, livelihood and dignity” 4 Human security
encompasses not only the freedom from violent
threats but also availability of and freedom
towards development, such as access to educa-
tion and health, freedom from poverty and envi-
ronmental degradation. The United Nations
Development Programme’s 1994 Human Devel-
opment Report characterized Human Security
as consisting of “freedom from fear” and “free-
dom from want”.  
Human security is a new paradigm advocated by
the UN system for understanding global vulnera-
bilities of individuals that challenges the tradi-
tional notion of national security. Traditionally,
security issues were examined under the frame-
work of state sovereignty, state security and mil-
itary power to defend the state border. Howev-
er, state security at the national border does not
necessarily ensure people’s security when
armed conflicts take place within the country, or
where global threats like infectious diseases or
environmental degradation spread across
national boundaries making all individuals vul-
nerable irrespective of borders. Border control
by armed forces is ineffective against infectious
disease or global warming. Thus, in the last 20
years, the attention of the international commu-
nity has shifted from the “security of the state”
to the “security of the people”, or human securi-
ty, which complements state security. 
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Refugees flee their home countries seeking
“freedom from fear” and sometimes “freedom
from want”, which is caused by discriminatory
and oppressive policies. In order to protect
refugees who are fleeing their country, the first
thing to do is to provide them with asylum in
another country in a way to stop the harmful
effects of persecution or armed conflicts. How-
ever, even if refugees are granted asylum in a
country, that does not mean refugees are free
from victimization and their human rights are
fully protected. Many refugees remain in vulner-
able conditions in the country of asylum.
This is typical of refugees in refugee camps
around the world. They have lost homes, land,
loved ones, personal property, and constantly
worry about their family members who have
been left behind. They particularly worry about
their children’s future. In the refugee camps,
there is no gainful employment, adult males are
forced to be idle, and the loss of occupational
and social roles leads to loss of identity and
pride, and may lead to domestic violence against
spouses and children. Anxiety, fear and insecu-
rity and loss of hope are everywhere. More than
six million refugees have been staying in refugee
camps or camp-like situations for more than five
years. The average duration of living in such sit-
uations is 17 years. Concerns of the internation-
al society on the plight of people in “protracted
refugee situations” have led to the increasing
use of third-country refugee resettlement policy
to be discussed later in this Note. 
Therefore, the provision of human security to
retugees entails two dimensions: international
protection and domestic empowerment. The
first key to human security of refugees is to pro-
tect them from threats of persecution (freedom
from fear) through international “territorial pro-
tection” combined with the principle of “non-
refoulement”. 5 If refugees are granted asylum by
a State, they are physically and legally protected
in the territory of that State, as the persecuting
State (or non-State actors) cannot harm the
refugees anymore without violating the sover-
eignty of the former. However, territorial protec-
tion in itself is not sufficient for ensuring human
security of the refugees who have lost every-
thing and have to re-establish life in a new envi-
ronment in the country of asylum. The second
key is, therefore, to empower refugees by pro-
viding them with practical measures and sup-
port in order to re-establish their life such as
language training, job search assistance facilitat-
ing their access to education and social welfare
benefits (freedom from want). Without means to
survive, international territorial protection is
meaningless. International territorial protection
must be complemented by in-country, domestic
empowerment measures to give human security
its substance. The “horizontal” territorial protec-
tion and “vertical” empowerment within a coun-
try are schematically shown in Chart 2.
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2 Human Security as International Public
Goods
2.1 The Refugee Regime
People have been forced to flee their homes
since time immemorial, but the political and
legal category of “refugees” and their protection
system are only less than a century old. It was
only after World War II that States, deeply
regretting the inabiliby of the international soci-
ety to prevent the atrocities committed against
millions of Jewish and other refugees, agreed to
establish the “Refugee Regime” consisting of the
1951 Refugee Convention, the UNHCR as a
supervisory body, and hundreds of NGOs that
provide direct assistance and financial donors
who provide money. The Refugee Convention,
UNHCR, States and NGOs constitute the
“Refugee Regime” of international society of the
21st century. At the core of the “Refugee
Regime” is the UNHCR, an international humani-
tarian agency that has been advocating for the
international refugee protection and empower-
ment system as well as finding durable solutions
to the refugee problems. From a small office of
some 30 staff in the early 1950s, the UNHCR has
grown into a global organization with more than
6,500 staff in many conflict-affected countries
and an annual budget of US$1.8 billion. It is one
of the largest and influential UN organizations. 
The aim of the Refugee Regime is to provide
refugees with human security, i.e., to protect and
empower refugees in such a way to bridge the
protection gaps when national protection fails,
and to produce durable solutions to refugee
problems. Durable solutions include voluntary
repatriation to the home country, local integra-
tion in the country of asylum, and resettlement
to a third country. If and when the causes of the
flight of refugees (conflicts or persecution)
cease, voluntary repatriation is the natural and
the best solution. When repatriation is not possi-
ble, there is the solution of local integration,
whereby refugees live permanently in the host
country, eventually becoming its citizens. When
neither repatriation nor local integration is possi-
ble, there is the solution of the third-country
resettlement, whereby very vulnerable refugees
like the sick, orphaned children and single
women are resettled from the current host coun-
try to a third-country. The aim of resettlement is
twofold: to eliminate dangers to the most vulner-
able refugees, and to share protection
burden/responsibilities among States. In light of
the increasing number of refugees in protracted
refugee situations, the UNHCR has been appeal-
ing to the international community to expand the
third-country resettlement program, and in
recent years some 100,000 refugees are resettled
– over 60,000 to the United States – every year. 
2.2 Human Security for refugees as interna-
tional (Global) public goods
Refugee protection and empowerment are ser-
vices or goods produced by the Refugee Regime,
and can be considered as an international (glob-
al) public good. A public good is a good that is
non-rivalrous and non-excludable. Non-rivalry
means that consumption or use of the good or
service by one party does not reduce availability
of the good for consumption or use by others.
Non-excludability means that no one can be
effectively excluded from using the good or ser-
vice. According to the 1951 Refugee Convention,
anyone who meets the criteria of a refugee is
entitled to an internatioal protection such as the
application of the principle of non refoulement,
regardless whether there are other refugees
seeking international protection (non-rivalrous).
As long as the provisions of the Refugee Con-
vention are strictly observed, no asylum seekers
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can be denied a refugee status even in a stuation
where there are many asylum seekers (non-
excludability). From a refugee protection point
of view, however, there are two types of prob-
lems inherent in the nature of a public good.
First, while all States (as well as refugees) bene-
fit from having an international refugee protec-
tion regime, each State has an incentive not to
make a fair contribution to the system. The
Refugee Regime is a voluntary system and no
State is obliged to accept refugees against its
own will, hence there is always an incentive for
States to shift, and not share, responsibilities to
others. If States act in their self-interest and
avoid assuming protection burdens/responsibili-
ties, the production of a public good (refugee
protection) will be reduced and the Refugee
Regime as a whole will be undermined and
weakened. This is the problem of so-called “free-
riding”. States have rights to grant asylum but
no obligation or duty to do so. States that shoul-
der less than a fair share of protection responsi-
bilities are “free riders” as they benefit from the
existence of the Refugee Regime but do not fully
share the cost of maintaining the Regime.
Eighty percent of the world’s refugees are living
in poor developing countries such as Pakistan
and Iran that host some 2 million Afghan
refugees for over 20 years. The economic, social
and political costs of those host countries are
enormous, as the presence of a large number of
refugees could cause conflicts over scare
resources, upset delicate ethnic balances or trig-
ger religious and political tensions in the host
society. As long as those States accommodate
refugees, other States can avoid assuming a “fair
share” of international protection responsibility.
Developing countries that have been accommo-
dating hundreds of thousands of refugees for
decades have been complaining about the “unfair
burdens” imposed on them by rich “free rider”
States. The challenge to the international society
is to limit free riding and ensure international
responsibility sharing. One of the solutions is the
third-country resettlement mechanism. 
The second problem is that territorial protection
does not provide refugees with an assurance
that they will be able to establish a new life in
the host country, regain what has been lost dur-
ing exile, and enjoy human security: freedom
from fear and want. Their empowerment
through assistance in language training, finding
jobs, in children’s education, and in obtaining
citizenship, are as important as the territorial
protection, yet these measures are often not
provided in sufficient quantity and quality.
Under the Refugee Convention, once accepted,
refugees are entitled to the right to access
national courts, the right to employment and
education, and other social, economic, and civil
rights which are on a par with the nationals of
the host country. However, many States fail to
do so either due to their inability or unwilling-
ness.
While territorial protection is an international
public good which can be provided by the State
government, integration support is a national
public good which is to be produced not only by
the national government, but by local authorities
and civil society comprising NGOs, corporations,
and the media as well as the existing refugee
community. Providing such public goods is more
complex than provision of territorial protection,
which basically means letting refugees in the
country. Unless a national support system is
established in such a way that refugees have
effective access to social services wherever they
live, it may end up with a situation where rights
exist in theory but access is in practice denied
and refugees cannot enjoy “freedom from want”.
Human security then is a dream and not reality.
3 Japan’s Refugee Policy – Its Past
3.1 Japan Bashing and Japan Passng
Seen from the perspective of refugee protection
as an international public good, Japan offers an
interesting case.
The ODA Charter of Japan promotes the notion
of human security as one of the five basic ODA
principles. The Charter states that “In order to
address direct threats to individuals such as con-
flicts, disasters, infectious diseases, it is impor-
tant not only to consider the global, regional, and
national perspectives, but also to consider the
perspective of human security, which focuses on
individuals. Accordingly, Japan will implement
ODA to strengthen the capacity of local commu-
nities through human resource development. To
ensure that human dignity is maintained at all
stages, from the conflict stage to the reconstruc-
tion and development stages, Japan will extend
assistance for the protection and empower-
ment of individuals (italics added)”. 6 The
question is whether Japan actually follows the
charter.
Japan has been generous in providing financial
resources to the UNHCR. In the last several
years, Japan’s financial contribution to the
UNHCR has exceeded US$100 million despite
decreasing Japanese foreign aid. On the other
hand, the number of refugees accepted by Japan
is extremely low. Other than the 11,000 Indochi-
nese refugees who have been accepted over the
last 30 years, Japan has recognized under the
Refugee Convention only 570 refugees by 2010.
In the 1990s, the average number of refugees
recognized in Japan was a mere 4.5. It was
reported that in the late 1990s, the then Director
of the Immigration Bureaus expressed his wish
that no refugee would come to Japan, arguing
that Japanese people were opposed to accepting
refugees. 7 Such an attitude would have been
known to asylum seekers in the world. This con-
trasts sharply with the policies of the US and
European countries which have been accepting
thousands or tens of thousands of refugees
under the Convention on an annual basis for
decades. Japan’s approach has been using “check
book diplomacy” - an approach with the implicit
message that “we will give you money, please
take care of refugees outside of Japan”. The poli-
cy stance has been criticized by the international
community as “responsibility shifting” and “free
riding”. Japan’s restrictive refugee policy has
indeed been one of the prominent areas of
“Japan bashing”. 8
However, such “Japan bashing” is somewhat
misplaced. It is not so much that the govern-
ment does not allow letting in refugees as
refugees are not coming to Japan asking for asy-
lum. Most asylum seekers in the world are actu-
ally engaged in “Japan passing.” Only a dozen
asylum seekers come from China, which pro-
duces some 20,000 asylum seekers annually.
The same goes for Russia, one of the largest
refugee-producing countries with 20,000 asylum
seekers leaving the country every year. 9 Even
North Korean refugees do not choose Japan as a
country of asylum. A typical example was the
North Korean family who, in mid-2007, arrived
in Niigata, Japan in a small boat after a perilous
sea trip across 800 km in the Sea of Japan but
who did not ask for asylum in Japan – they left
for South Korea. As we will see later, under the
new resettlement plan started in 2010, the
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Japanese government offered 30 Myanmar
refugees to be resettled to Japan from a refugee
camp in Thailand, however, only 40 applied and
27 refugees eventually agreed to come to Japan.
For the 2011 programme, only 30 applied
against the quota of 30. This is surprising as
there is always strong competition from
refugees to be accepted by one of the 16 States
that have UNHCR sponsored resettlement pro-
gram. Iceland, with a population of only 300,000,
accepts 30 Palestinian refugees a year and there
are always many applicants. Japan is (still) not a
popular country among refugees.
Asylum seekers in general and refugees who are
seeking a resettlement opportunity in particular
do choose countries of asylum. 10 They are aware
that even after asylum is granted in Japan, con-
ditions surrounding refugees are quite tough
and not conducive to their fast and effective
social and economic integration. Official integra-
tion support is very limited both in length and
quantity. Local governments are not involved in
their integration support, NGOs that assist
refugees in Japan are few in number and, impor-
tantly, the refugee community is too small and
fragmented to be effective partners to provide
assistance to fellow refugees in a society that
tends to exclude and marginalize foreigners and
in particular refugees. Asylum seekers feel that
they would not enjoy human security in Japan,
and thus passing Japan and go elsewhere. The
perceired absence of human security is an
important reason why refugees avoid coming to
Japan.
3.2 Indo-Chinese Refugees
The lack of human security for refugees in Japan
was confirmed by the recent study conducted
by the UNHCR and the United Nations Universi-
ty on the integration of some 11,000 Indochi-
nese refugees accepted in Japan during the last
30 years. 11 While a quasi-governmental organi-
zation (RHQ) sponsored by the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs has helped facilitate integration of
the refugees and their families by providing lan-
guage and culture classes as well as vocational
counselling for years, there are a large number
of refugees who are still suffering from unstable
and unpredictable lives in a kind of “protracted
refugee situation”. The most often quoted exam-
ple of the lack of empowering support is the lack
of adequate Japanese language training. The
government offered only four months of lan-
guage training and this has caused long lasting
handicaps for refugees to become self-reliant.
Lacking language proficiency, there were few
opportunities for them to find jobs except those
“dirty, difficult and dangerous”. Many refugees
pointed out difficulty in finding decent housing,
unfamiliarity with wage and promotion system,
financial problems, difficulty in handling admin-
istrative procedures, and uncertainty in chil-
dren’s education such as future career, expens-
es and native languages and cultures. Their
access to such social security services has been
limited and, partly because of this, many
refugees have remained in the lower socio-eco-
nomic bracket of Japanese society.
Indochinese refugees who have spent years liv-
ing in Japan wish to attain Japanese citizenship.
However, the barrier to gaining citizenship is too
high for them to overcome. The requirements
for Japanese citizenship are numerous, such as
requiring birth certificates, which are difficult
for refugees to obtain, proof of financial self-
reliance and the requirement to renounce their
nationality. In general, standards are so high
that many applicants have simply given up.
According to a survey conduded in 2004, only 5
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per cent of the refugees who responded to a sur-
vey obtained Japanese nationality. 12 This causes
them to feel that they are forever a ’refugee’ or
’gaijin’, a person who cannot put down roots and
become a full member of society.
On the other hand, the refugees are aware that
refugees who have been resettled in other reset-
tlement countries have much easier access to
higher education, skill acquisition and citizen-
ship. In the United States, refugees can obtain a
green card after one year stay there and citizen-
ship is available after five years. Refugees can
expect to enjoy higher level of human security
there. Although many refugees in Japan appreci-
ate the fact that Japan has provided them with
asylum and a level of safety and freedom, some
felt that they have experienced a ‘secondary vic-
timization’ by living in Japan and feel discontent
towards the Japanese government and society.
A minority of refugees regret having come to
Japan at all. 13 This is a case that demonstrates
that territorial protection does not necessarily
offer human security for refugees.
One can observe three problems in terms of
integration support in Japan. First, Japan’s sys-
tem of refugee reception and integration supp-
port is highly centralized. The initial orientation
and training is done in Tokyo and only by the
government-controlled RHQ without the
involvement of local governments where the
refugees may eventually settle. Most of the
industrialized countries have a refugee disper-
sion policy whereby the central government pro-
vides funding to local municipalities and NGOs
that provides integration support in several
parts in the country. Japan’s centralized system
contributes to the notion that refugee assistance
is a matter of the central government, and not
that of local governments or local civil society.
Except for the cities and towns near the Settle-
ment Promotion Centres established for the
Indochinese refugees (like Yamato city), most of
the local governments did not have direct con-
tact with the refugees and they have not gained
experience on how to handle refugees who have
different integration needs compared to foreign
workers (economic migrants) whose number in
Japan has increased sharply in the last two
decades to reach one million.
Second, there are only a few NGOs that have
provided assistance to refugees residing in
Japan and the resources available to those NGOs
have been meagre. The Indo-Chinese refugee
crisis led to the creation and growth of dozens of
Japanese volunteer groups and NGOs, many of
which later expanded their activities to address
a range of global issues. NGOs have contributed
to promoting a deeper understanding of refugee
issues using advocacy, and through their consid-
erable dedication and personal efforts. However,
operationally, most of their activities have been
refugee programs abroad and not inside Japan.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) started
providing funds for refugee assistance NGOs
that operate in developing countries in mid-
1990, but no fund is provided to NGOs that offer
assistance within Japan. As for UNHCR, it pro-
vides only some $200,000 to such NGOs from up
to $140 million it annually receives from MOFA.
The NGO community in Japan assisting refugees
in Japan is very small and money available to
them is meagre.
Third, refugee communities that would offer
assistance to fellow refugees and asylum seekers
are too small and fragmented on ethnic or politi-
cal lines. Some refugees attend church services
and other recreation events, but many refugees
have no time to join as they have to work even
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during the weekend, while others prefer to
remain anonymous for fear of discrimination.
Political backgrounds that led refugees to flee
from their home countries affect the way
refugee communities organize themselves in
Japan. In the absence of a strong refugee com-
munity, asylum seekers will be reluctant to
choose Japan as a country of asylum, since
assistance from the same ethnic groups sharing
the same language and culture, can provide
strong psychological, emotional and social sup-
port, which cannot be provided by other support
groups. However, if asylum seekers do not
choose to come to Japan, then the refugee com-
munities would remain small and weak. There is
a vicious circle of a small refugee community,
inability to provide assistance, small number of
asylum seekers and refugees, ending up with a
small refugee community.
3.3 Recent changes: start of the pilot third-
country resettlement program
Fortunately, the situation is beginning to move
in the right direction. The number of asylum
seekers in Japan has been on the rise. It reached
1,600 in 2008, of which 57 were recognized as
refugees. An additional 350 asylum seekers were
granted special permits to stay in Japan tem-
porarily (humanitarian status), although their
refugee claims were rejected. In 2009 the num-
ber of asylum seekers was 1,388, of which 30
were recognized as refugees, while 531 were
granted humanitarian permits to stay. Respec-
tive numbers for 2010 were 1,202, 39 and 363. 14
All in all, 400 to 500 asylum seekers have been
granted some form of protection in Japan in
recent years. Since around 1000 individuals seek
asylum in Japan every year, the “protection
rate” is now around 50%, which is much higher
than previously when few humanitarian statuses
were granted. 
The reasons for the increase include, among
others: the amendment to the Immigration and
Refugee Recognition Act in 2005 that improved
the refugee status recognition process; and the
surge in national sympathy toward Myanmar
asylum seekers following the deliberate killing of
a Japanese journalist in Yangon in 2007. Myan-
mar asylum seekers, often undocumented and
hiding in anonymity, have come out, some
joined anti-Yangon demonstrations, and sought
asylum in Japan, claiming that their life would
by in danger it forcibly returned (refouled) to
Myanmar. Most of the recent asylum seekers
and refugees granted refugee status are from
Myanmar. This is problematic by itself, nonethe-
less, if one recalls that a decade ago only a
dozen asylum seekers came to Japan and only a
few were recognized as refugees each year, this
is a significant improvement.
The most remarkable policy change is the start
of a pilot third-country resettlement program. In
December 2008, the Japanese government
announced that it would start a pilot refugee
resettlement program from 2010 for a period of
three years. Each year, 30 Myanmar refugees
living camps in western Thailand will be reset-
tled in Japan. While this is a pilot program and
the number is very small, there is an expectation
that this program will expand in the future. This
policy decision was a pleasant surprise to the
humanitarian community both in Japan and
abroad. The decision was hailed worldwide not
only as a turning point in Japanese hitherto
exclusionary refugee policy, but also as an indi-
cation that the Asian region itself is changing
from a region that produces as many refugees as
Africa but does not accept those refugees. 15 The
policy change was surprising to many because,
unlike the acceptance of the Indochinese
refugees during the 1970s and 1980s that have
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been “imposed” on Japan, 16 this time the Japan-
ese government took the decision without for-
eign pressure. This is contrary to the image of
Japan that changes its foreign policy only under
foreign pressure (Gai-atsu).
The decision making process leading to the Cab-
inet decision on 18 December 2009 is character-
ized by secretive bureaucratic consensus mak-
ing, personal leadership and strong media inter-
est. The author was indirectly involved in the
decision making process as the then UNHCR
Representative in Japan and was in a position to
observe part of the process. The following
observations reflect the author’s experience.
For years UNHCR tried to persuade the Japan-
ese government to start a resettlement program
but in vain. Taking the advantage of having the
first Japanese Representative who used to work
in the Immigration Bureau of the Ministry of
Justice, UNHCR Tokyo Office started a two-
front approach, one public advocacy for the a
resettlement program and another a “quiet
diplomacy” through informal meetings with offi-
cials of the Ministry of Justice (MOJ). UNHCR
changed its hitherto confrontational approach,
whereby it criticized publicly the legalistic and
inflexible stance of the MOJ. Instead, UNHCR
acknowledged certain positive developments in
the last several years and encouraged the MOJ
to accelerate the change, because that would,
among others, improve the image of the MOJ.
The MOJ officials were pleased with the new
approach of UNHCR and mutual confidence
between UNHCR and the officials started build-
ing up.
While reminding MOJ officials of the strong criti-
cism made by Ms Sadako Ogata, the former UN
High Commissioner for Refugees, that “Japan
(meaning MOJ officials) lacks humanity” in deal-
ing with refuge, 17 UNHCR “sold” the “benefits”
of the resettlement program from the point of
view of the MOJ. One of the MOJ’s obsessions
was the possible security implications of accept-
ing larger number of refugees. UNHCR pointed
out that Japan does not need to be concerned
about the possible security risks because candi-
dates for resettlement to Japan will be back-
ground checked and selected by UNHCR. MOJ
then can choose those refugees who Japan
deems better fit for resettlement to Japan. In
addition, the MOJ does not need to go through
the complex and lengthy refugee status determi-
nation process under the Refugee Convention,
which could take up to two years, hence per
capita administrative costs of the resettlement
program is much lower than the normal refugee
status determination process. UNHCR also sug-
gested that the pilot program could be fairly a
small one, possibl a few families, because what is
important is not the size but the quality of inte-
gration support after refugees have been
received. Accepting only a small number of
refugees initially would also prevent possible
opposition to the resettlement initiative. Thus, a
resettlement program meets the interests of the
refugees, the MOJ and UNHCR. The MOJ took
into account these advantages in recommending
the start of a resettlement program to the Cabi-
net.
The then Director of the Immigration Bureau,
Mr. Inami, played a significant role in the deci-
sion making process. He recalls that although
the government had never considered the issue
of the resettlement program previously, he had
been feeling thet it was time for the government
to consider the subject. The appeal by the new
UNHCR Representative to start a resettlement
program was therefore a turning point.18 After 6
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months of quiet dialogue with UNHCR, in the
summer of 2007, he established a “study group
(benkyo-kai)” to understand what is a refugee
resettlement program. Members were the mid-
dle-level managers of the MOJ, MOFA and the
Cabinet Office. The group collected information
about the policies, practices and procedures of
other resettlement countries with assistance and
advice from UNHCR. Their activities were kept
in strict secrecy to avoid stirring political oppo-
sition. Media inquiry started to intensify but
even the existence of the group was denied by
the MOJ and MOFA officials. The group com-
pleted its work by the fall of 2007 and proposed
to establish a “consultation group (kento-kai)”
to find out how it could be implemented in
Japan and its implications. Inami mobilized
political support among politicians and the then
Minister of Justice Hatoyama (whose wife is an
Australian), who approved it. In the Japanese
bureaucracy, establishing a “consultation group”
implies that a new policy is in principle
endorsed. In November 2007., the start of the
consultation process was conveyed to the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guter-
res who was visiting Japan, and for the first time
the plan was made public at his press interview.
The issue of third-country resettlement was
first time taken up at the House of Representa-
tive Budget Committee in December 2007. Min-
ister of Justice, Hatoyama remarked that he con-
sidered that a resettlement program would be
Japan’s contribution to the international com-
munity.
Hatoyama, who is known for his outspoken
stance and for going beyond what bureaucrats
wish him to say, made personal commitments
that he and his staff at the MOJ would seriously
study the introduction of a new policy and lead
the process. 19 In the first half of 2008, extensive
research and discussion took place in the inter-
Ministerial meetings and by the summer 2008,
when the budget for 2009 was prepared, a basic
plan and budget was made within the MOFA
that is responsible for the initial 6 months orien-
tation and training program. By that time the
idea to start a 3-year pilot program was
endorsed at the top level of the government.
The decision came as a surprise, even to a very
high ranking official of MOFA. With a consensus
within the government and endorsement from
major politicians, the formal decision to start a
pilot program finally arrived in the form of a
Cabinet Understanding at the bi-weekly Cabinet
meeting on 18 December 2008 and the decision
was formally conveyed to Gueteres who was
again visiting Japan by then Prime Minister Aso.
The detail of the plan was made public on the
Cabinet Office homepage. 20 Throughout this
process intensive media coverage, mostly sup-
portive, continued, reflecting strong national
interest in Japan. Advocates’ tactics to sell the
benefits of the resettlement program and to
build up intra-governmental and political sup-
port for resettlement by secretive lobbying,
informal consultation (nemawashi) as well as
public advocacy campaign through media
worked.
3.4 Constructivist interpretation
The sudden and surprising decision by the
Japanese Government to start a third-country
resettlement program could be explained by the
“social constructivism” approach in international
relations.
The “constructivism” approach, according to
Alexander Wendt, entails basically two notions;
that the structures of human association are
determined primarily by shared ideas, and that
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the identities and interests of purposive actors
are constructed by these shared ideas rather
than given by nature. 21 It postulates that the
“social structure” comprising of mutually shared
ideas, norms, identities, rules and expectations
constrains and shapes interests of individuals
and States. The changed interests influence
their behaviors. However, individuals and groups
are not only shaped by the “social structure” but
can also make free choices and change it as
“agents” who can set into motion new norma-
tive, social or political practices that alter con-
ventional thinking and procedures. Social struc-
ture and agents are mutually constitutive. 22 An
actor, or a group of actors, can use speech acts
to “socialize” certain norms and values among
decision makers. Socially constructed rules,
principles, norms of behavior, and shared beliefs
may provide States, individuals, and other actors
with understanding of what is important, valu-
able and appropriate and what are effective
and/or legitimate means of obtaining those val-
ued goods. In other words, structures may sup-
ply States with both preferences and strategies
for pursuing those preferences. Some construc-
tivists emphasize the importance of roles played
by international organizations in generating new
international norms, and spreading them by
“teaching” decision makers of States new norms,
new values and new priorities, which change the
States’ behaviors. International organizations are
not only created by States but they influence
States’ interests and behaviors. 23 States accept
new international norms and internalize them in
domestic institutions when they are “socialized”
to perceive such norms as legitimate. Accepting
refugee protection norms for reasons of self-
interest may well change State behavior.24.
In the last 60 years, one can observe changing
norms, identities, interests, power and agency
with respect to refugee protection in the world
and in Japan. In 1951 the Refugee Convention
was signed but Japan was not a signatory –
Japan was not even a member of the United
Nations. In 1981, during the Indochinese refugee
crisis, Japan reluctantly joined the 1951 Refugee
Convention under strong pressure from the
international community, particularly from the
United States. But Japan assumed nominal
responsibility to abide by the norms of refugee
protection contained in the Convention, as evi-
denced by the extremely small number of
refugees admitted to Japan until the late 1990s.
Japan has not really accepted the refugee pro-
tection norms prevailing at the international
level until secently. 
In 1994 the United Nations Development Pro-
gram (UNDP) published the 1994 Human Devel-
opment Report, in which the notion of Human
Security was presented for the first time. In
2000, the UN General Assembly established the
Commission of Human Security that issued its
final report; Human Security Now in 2003. The
report contains 10 points, one of which is to
support the security of refugees and internally
displaced persons.  In the same year, Japan
adopted the new ODA charter that contains
Human Security as one of the guiding principles
and since then, promotion of Human Security
has been at the core of Japan’s foreign aid poli-
cy. One can say that the United Nations devel-
oped and “taught” Japan the value of Human
Security for vulnerable people including
refugees.
Since the mid-1990s, UNHCR has been promot-
ing the third-country resettlement program in
the face of an increasing number of protracted
refugee situations. In 1995, a Working Group on
Resettlement was established, involving the par-
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ticipation of the ten traditional resettlement
countries to discuss their annual refugee reset-
tlement quota. In 2001, a handbook on resettle-
ment was published and UNHCR encouraged
States and the NGO community to promote
international protection and international
responsibility sharing through reseltlement pro-
grams. 25 The number of States implementing
third-country resettlement program has since
increased to 18, not including Japan which has
just started a pilot program. UNHCR estimates
the global resettlement needs at about 800,000
persons over a period of several years and is
stepping up its effort to sell the value of the
third-country resettlement program worldwide,
in particular for Japan. 
While promoting refugee resettlement as a form
of sustainable solution, UNHCR has tried for
years to persuade Japan to be a resettlement
country. The former High Commissioner Ogata,
who had/has strong influence in the Japanese
government, has tried it but could not convince
the Government. The present High Commission-
er Guterres has sold the idea to the government
each time he visited Tokyo since 2006. Hatoya-
ma admitted that he had been strongly urged by
Guterres to start a resettlement program.
UNHCR Office in Tokyo started its strong cam-
paign for resettlement in February 2007 and
continued formal and informal lobbying to pro-
mote resettlement. Japanese bureaucracy start-
ed moving, by participating for the first time in
the Resettlement Working Group meeting in
Geneva in summer 2007.
One can see the impact of UNHCR’s advocacy
and “education” in the fact that Japan started
appreciating the norms in general and specific
values of a resettlement program for Japan.
Through discourse (although limited to a small
group of actors) on refugee acceptance, shared
view has emerged that by resettling only a few
dozens of refugees to Japan, Japan can gain a lot
with less costs. It is in Japan’s “national interest”
to dissipate the negative image of a country
closed to refugees or a country that lacks
humanity and a resettlement program would
eliminate such a poor reputation. MOJ and
MOFA officials have repeatedly stated that the
resettlement program is a form of Japan’s
international contribution. That is to share the
view that the provision of an international public
good in the form of refugee protection in Japan,
thereby changing the perception of Japan as a
“free rider”, is in Japan’s interest. It is also to
agree that it is difficult to maintain Japan’s iden-
tity as a promoter of Human Security while clos-
ing its door to refugees fleeing persecution. Both
Japan’s national interest and identity were re-
assessed in the discourse preceding the start of
refugee resettlement in Japan. The agreed view
was that the program would be in line with
Japan’s identity as humanitarian power and
would enhance Japan’s reputation and its
national interest in international society.
However, reaching such a “shared view” was
neither straightforward nor easy. Within the
government, there have been divergent interests
and views among the 11 Ministries involved in
the decision making process. The Cabinet
Office, MOFA and particularly MOJ have been
promoting the resettlement plan, being aware of
the reputational value of such a plan, while Min-
istries like the Ministry of the General Affairs
and the National Police Agency have been reluc-
tant, if not opposed, to the new policy, because
for the latter the more pressing concern is to
protect vulnerable Japanese citizens who have
lost jobs and not refugees. However, the argu-
ment that it is time and appropriate for Japan to
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accept more refugees in the form of resettle-
ment as part of international responsibility/bur-
den sharing eventually prevailed. Japan has
come a long way to get rid of the perception of a
“free rider” in the international Refugee Regime,
and to prove that it seriously intends to provide
human security to the victims of forced dis-
placement, although in a very limited and sym-
bolic manner. In terms of change agents to bring
about the shift in Japan’s refugee policy, the cat-
alytic roles played by UNHCR, an international
orgainization, were significant.
As for the roles of agents in the national level
and within the government, reform minded indi-
viduals, like Inami and his staff,  played active
roles in challenging the established notion that
Japan cannot accept refugees for a variety of
reasons and convinced top level policy makers
to change the existing policy, against high odds.
25 Their careful advocacy worked. Senior parlia-
mentarians including former Prime Minister
Mori and Cabinet Secretary Machimura, and MP
Aisawa of the LDP joined the group of support-
ers. Komeito, a political party affiliated with a
powerful religious organization Soka Gakkai,
established a project team on the refugee issues
and actively promoted the resettlement plan,
apparently sensing the positive media reports. A
few members of the Domocratic Party also sup-
ported the plan.
The MOJ’s image has improved as the media
reports on the unexpected positive develop-
ments in refugee policy, and the relations
between the MOJ and UNHCR have notably
improved. They communicate frequently and
the advice of UNHCR is taken seriously by MOJ.
These were not seen in the past and the new
alliance of change agents between the MOJ and
UNHCR will further advance the refugee dis-
course in Japan, in a way, to widen the asylum
space in Japan.
The supportive mode of the bureaucrats and
parliamentarians was influenced by another
agency, the national media reporting positively
on the resettlement issue. As mentioned earlier,
government officials kept the deliberations on
the resettlement policy secret, fearful of possi-
ble oppositions from the parliamentarians and
the general public. But their apprehension was
not justified. National media started reporting
on the study group as early as mid-2007, and
reports and editorials of the national dailies as
well as TV news programs have been supportive
and encouraging of the new direction of the gov-
ernment policy, with a proviso that the govern-
ment has to provide resettled refugees with suf-
ficient language training and skills training as
well as long term integration support, so that
the refugees can become members of the Japan-
ese society as soon as possible. 26 This has not
only silenced possible oppositions and public
concerns but positively influenced the percep-
tions of the parliamentarians and bureaucrats
who consider media reports and editorials of
national dailies would reflect popular thinking.
Inami also admitted the very important role the
Japanese media played in forging positive public
opinions and thereby encouraging the departure
from the past policy. 27 On 28 September 2010
when the first group of 28 Karen refugees
arrived at Narita airport, a horde of media
reporters surrounded the refugees who were
obviously astonished by the attention paid to
them. There have been a large number of TV
reports and newspaper articles, most of them
welcomed refugees but cautioned the govern-
ment to strengthen the integration support mea-
sures. The media are aware of the difficulties
the Indochinese refugees faced in Japan.
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Finally, the start of the resettlement program
has certainly been prompted by the national dis-
course on immigration. Given the prospect of a
rapidly shrinking and aging population in Japan,
some opinion leaders started a campaign to
open Japan for immigration. The then ruling
LDP, under the chair of PM Nakagawa,  formu-
lated a policy paper urging Japan to accept up to
10 million immigrants in the next 50 years.
UNHCR intervened asserting that accepting mil-
lions of migrants while closing the door to
refugees is inappropriate and would intensify
“Japan bashing”. Refugee protection is an
international obligation while accepting (or not)
economic migrants is a national policy issue.
The former should be accorded priority. The
final policy paper urges the government initially
to accept 1,000 refugees every year. 28 While
Japan is still divided on the issue of immigration,
a shared view has emerged that it is high time
for Japan to open its doors more widely to
refugees. Similar view is reflected in the recent
report on immigration submitted to the Prime
Minister by a powerful conservative body of
opinion maker, the Japan Forum on Internation-
al Relations. The Forum welcomed the start of
the nesettlement program in Japan. 29 One could
observe a new “structure” of socially shared
views on refugees is emerging and Japan’s
refugee policy would be guided and constrained
by the new “structure” in the coming years.
4 Japan’s Refugee Policy – Its Future
4.1 A start of a new era?
After many decades of exclusionary refugee pol-
icy, Japan seems to be opening its doors to
refugees at last. There is a perception that
Japan is set on a course to become a more open
society to refugees. Such common perception
will in turn lead to an increase in the number of
asylum seekers and, in consequence, in the
number of recognized refugees. In retrospect,
2008 was a turning point, when Japan aban-
doned the “vicious cycle” of keeping the door
tightly shut, thus discouraging asylum seekers,
in favor of a “virtuous cycle” of enhancing
refugee protection including the start of the
resettlement plan, and encouraging asylum
seekers.
Behind the shift in the government’s refugee
policy is a shift in the shared norms, views and
interests held by policy makers and public opin-
ions which were caused by advocacy initiatives
taken by UNHCR and reform-minded officials.
They created a new “structure” of new norms
and ideas which takes on a life of its own and it
will in turn shape the government’s subsequent
actions. 30 But whether Japan as a nation has
really abandoned  its closed door policy in an
irreversable manner and if more refugees will
come to Japan thus reversing the “Japan pass-
ing” trend is still uncertain. Asylum seekers have
penetrating eyes and they will critically assess if
Japan has become a trustworthy country of asy-
lum that offers as much human security for
them, particularly empowerment measures, as
that offered by other countries.
In order to “attract” more refugees, new arrange-
ments and practices are needed in such a way to
make Japan’s refugee protection “owned” by all
stakeholders throughout the country. First, the
government has to stop hitherto secretive and
paternalistic refugee settlement policy and
should seek support of the local governments,
NGOs and private companies for building a
national integration support system. The govern-
ment’s role should be limited to the decision of
quota, namely decisions as to how many refugees
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should be resettled to Japan and from which
country. The government should also  establish a
long term integration plan. A situation where
most of the resettled refugees will settle in
Tokyo area and engage in jobs like dishwashing
and cleaning should be avoided. Concentration of
refugees in Tokyo area will not only lead to a
refugee colony and create social integration
problems, but also deprive local cities and towns
of valuable opportunities to join in international
cooperation and humanitarian assistance.
Refugees should be given several options regard-
ing the place of settlement including local cities
and towns away from Tokyo. It is encouraging
that the government has recently decided to set-
tle the first group of Karen refugees in two cities
in Aichi prefecture and Chiba prefecture.31
Second, the government should transfer budgets
to assist resettled refugees in Japan (some $2
million in 2011) to local governments, imple-
menting NGOs including the existing refugee
communities asking the latter to provide direct
integration assistance. The practice of integra-
tion support only by the government, only in
Tokyo and only for 6 months is not sustainable.
No resettlement country resettles (by default or
by intention) refugees in its capital. By a refugee
(and budget) dispersion policy, local govern-
ments could build up their capacities to become
partners to assist and empower refugees.
Human security for refugees as international
public goods cannot be provided only in Tokyo
or only by the government. They are “national
products” to be produced by all parties con-
cerned, including local governments, local NGOS
and importantly refugee comminities. In this
respect, it is encouraging that the First Retail-
ing, the world’s fourth-largest specialty apparel
retailer, has recently agreed with UNHCR to
start an internship program for refugees in
Japan to work at UNIQLO stores so as to help
them gain professional experience and encour-
age integration into Japanese society.32
4.3 Research Questions
There are several research questions. First is
the detailed analysis of the discourse and deci-
sion making process leading to the start of the
resettlement program, as outlined in previous
paragraphs. The introduction of the resettle-
ment program will have long-lasting and signifi-
cant impact on Japan’s refugee policies and
examining the process is by itself useful, partic-
ularly in Japan when policy making is done via
consensus bullding. The constructivist approach
seems best fit for the analysis. The hypothesis
presented here is that socially constructed rules,
principles, norms of behavior and shared beliefs
on refugee resettlement advocated by UNHCR
have provided the Japanese government and
policy makers with new understanding and real-
ization that resettlement is a valuable and effec-
tive means of providing refugees with human
security and that is also in Japan’s national
interest. The research should identify both shifts
in norms at the international level caused by
UNHCR and shifts within Japan at the govern-
ment and policy making level caused by UNHCR
in Japan. The analysis of the national discourse
and the impact of media in formulating the sup-
portive public opinion will be an important part
of the research. 
Second is the design of an effective national
integration support mechanism for the resettled
refugees, taking into account that many of the
resettled Myanmar refugees will encounter “civi-
lization” for the first time. Some of them have
limited education and would face enormous
challenges in social and economic integration in
Japan. How will they adapt to life in Japan?
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What are their needs? Who should help them
and in what way in such a manner to make
resettled refugees satisfied and content in living
in Japan? An anthropological perspective will be
useful here. 
The third question is the reasons as to why most
of asylum seekers, particularly Chinese, engage
in “Japan passing.” As for Chinese asylum seek-
ers, the commonly held view is that the govern-
ment does not recognize Chinese refugees for
fear of offending the Chinese government or for
fear of facing thousands of Chinese asylum seek-
ers. This assumption has to be challenged, as it
is possible that Chinese asylum seekers do not
believe that Japan will offer them with better
chance of enjoying “freedom from fear and
want” than in other countries, particularly in the
United States, where some 5,000 Chinese asy-
lum seekers are granted refugee status every
year and refugees can expect to obtain citizen-
ship in five years time. A hypothesis is that it is
not so much Japan does not accept Chinese
refugees as Chinese asylum seekers prefer other
countries of asylum. Given the proximity of
China, the small size of asylum seekers, pres-
ence of big Chinese migrant communities in
Japan, and the historical background between
the two countries, the research could generate
very interesting findings and observations for
the betterment of Japan’s refugee policy as well
as its migration policy.    
4.4 Concluding Remarks
This Research Note reviewed the causes of flight
of refugees and considered that refugees lack
human security. It argued that provision of
human security through territorial protection is
an international public good which tends to be
undersupplied because of “free riding”. While
“Japan bashing” has been going on for decades,
most of the world’s refugees are “passing by”
Japan, as they feel human security would  not be
provided to them in Japan. It is not so much that
Japan is closed as refugees are not coming to
Japan. The real barrier lies in the inability of
Japan to provide refugees with human security
inside the country after they have been accept-
ed. The lack of empowerment measures is a core
problem.
Fortunately, there has been notable improve-
ment in Japan’s refugee policy. The decision by
the Japanese government to start a pilot reset-
tlement program is an example. The decision
can be explained using a lens of constructivism
in international relations discipline, and from
that perspective, what is important for Japan is
a concerted advocacy by international and
domestic change agents to present new set of
norms, values and interests concerning
refugees, in a manner to make policy and opin-
ion makers wish to effect changes and reforms. 
By doing so, Japan can provide more and better
human security to much larger number of vic-
tims of forced displacement and can meet the
aspiration stated in the Preface of the Constitu-
tion: “We desire to occupy an honored place in
an international society striving for the preser-
vation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny
and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all
time from the earth. We recognize that all peo-
ples of the world have the right to live in the
peace, free from fear and want.” Japan’s new
refugee policy suggests that Japan is moving
towards the right direction to meet the national
aspiration. 
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